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Abstract. Classical epistemic logic describes implicit knowledge of agents about
facts and knowledge of other agents, based on semantic information. The latter
is produced by acts of observation or communication, that are described well by
dynamic epistemic logics. What these logics do not describe, however, is how sig-
niﬁcant information is also produced by acts of inference – and key axioms of the
system merely postulate “deductive closure”. In this paper, we take the view that
all information is produced by acts, and hence we also need a dynamic logic of
inference steps showing what eﬀort on the part of the agent makes a conclusion
explicit knowledge. Strong omniscience properties of agents should be seen not as
static idealizations, but as the result of dynamic processes that agents engage in.
This raises two questions: (a) how to deﬁne suitable information states of agents
and matching notions of explicit knowledge, (b) how to deﬁne natural processes
over these states that generate new explicit knowledge. To this end, we extend
earlier epistemic “awareness models” into a dynamic system that includes acts
of public observation, but also adding and dropping formulas from the currently
‘entertained’ set, we give a completeness theorem, and we show how this dynamics
updates explicit knowledge. Similar ideas have been proposed before, but they were
restricted to update with factual propositions; our new dynamic system applies to
arbitrary formulas.
We also extend our approach to multi-agent scenarios where awareness changes
may happen privately. Finally, we mention further directions and related approaches.
1. The problem of omniscience: what is ‘missing in action’
The usual discussions of the problem of omniscience in epistemic logic
revolve around the distribution axiom K(ϕ → ψ) → (Kϕ → Kψ). Is
knowledge closed under drawing logical inferences? If it is, so the story
goes, then we have idealized our knowing agents too much.
But this story is misleading on two accounts. First, with the usual se-
mantics of epistemic logic, the K operator really just describes implicit
semantic information of the agent, which deﬁnitely has the preceding
closure property. The point is rather that closure need not hold for a
related, but diﬀerent intuitive notion, viz. explicit “aware-that” knowl-
edge Exϕ, in some suitable sense to be deﬁned. So, what we really
need is not “epistemic logic bashing”, but a richer account of agents’
attitudes. Our ﬁrst question, then, is how to deﬁne explicit knowledge.2 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
But there is more. The interesting issue is not whether explicit
knowledge has deductive closure. It is rather: “what do agents have to
do to make their implicit knowledge explicit?” Consider the premises
Ex(ϕ → ψ),Exϕ of the distribution axiom, saying that the agent ex-
plicitly knows both ϕ → ψ and ϕ. These do imply Kψ, that is, the agent
knows ψ implicitly. But crucially, in order to make this information
explicit, the agent has to do some work, namely, perform an act of
“awareness raising” that leads to Exψ. Stated more syntactically, the
usual implication Ex(ϕ → ψ) → (Exϕ → Exψ) contains a gap [ ]:
Ex(ϕ → ψ) → (Exϕ → [ ]Exψ)
and in that gap, we should place an action. Note that, then, the agent
is no longer omniscient, but she is not defective either: with the right
repertoire of actions available, she can do awareness raising as needed.
This paper explores these ideas. We ﬁrst introduce simple epistemic
awareness models, with a speciﬁc interpretation of the syntactic com-
ponent as the formulas ‘entertained’ by the agent – and recall their
standard axiomatization. Then, we explore some proposals for deﬁning
explicit knowledge, picking one that we will work with. Next, we deﬁne
basic dynamic actions that modify our models, and provide examples of
their behaviour, alone and in combination. Representing the actions in
the language yields a sound and complete logic that clariﬁes our initial
issues. We also develop some formal properties and raise some open
problems. Then we move to the multi-agent case, developing tools for
private and even unconscious versions of our actions, that were public
so far. Finally, we relate our proposal to earlier ones, and end with
conclusions and further directions, in particular, toward agents with
beliefs that are modiﬁed by default inferences.
2. A static system for diﬀerent agent attitudes
We assume that the reader is familiar with classical epistemic logic
(EL for short). We have already stated our motivation for working
with this: even though this system fails for its intended interpretation
of ‘full-blooded knowledge’, like so many logical systems, it has turned
out quite adequate for other, perhaps originally non-intended inter-
pretations. In particular, it deals well with implicit knowledge of the
semantic range kind (cf. van Benthem and Mart´ ınez (2008)).
Now we extend the base language of EL. We add an operator Eϕ
saying that the agent “is aware of ϕ” (Fagin and Halpern, 1988) or,
in less psychological terms, that she “entertains ϕ” as a matter ofInference, Promotion, and the Dynamics of Awareness 3
attention. Notice that this does not imply any attitude pro or con:
the agent may believe ϕ, but also reject it. Stated in other, but related
terms, “awareness of” does not imply “awareness that”.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Language L). Let P be a set of atomic propositions.
Formulas ϕ of the epistemic awareness language L are given by
ϕ ::= p | Eϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | Kϕ
with p ∈ P. Other Boolean connectives ∨,→,↔, as well the existential
modal operator (c K) are deﬁned as usual.
We will read formulas Eϕ as “the agent entertains ϕ”, and formulas
Kϕ as “the agent knows ϕ implicitly”. The language is interpreted in
epistemic models assigning to each agent in each world a set of formulas,
representing the information she entertains.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Semantic model). An epistemic awareness model is a
tuple M = hW,R,E,V i where
− hW,R,V i is a standard epistemic model: a set or worlds W, an
accessibility relation R ⊆ (W×W), and a valuation V : P → ℘(W).
− E : W → ℘(L) is the “entertain” function giving the formulas
that the agent ‘has in mind’. E(w) is the entertained set at w.
As usual, a pointed model (M,w) also has a distinguished world w.
The semantic interpretation of formulas in L is entirely as expected:
Deﬁnition 2.3. Let (M,w) be a pointed semantic model with M =
hW,R,E,V i. Atomic propositions and boolean connectives are inter-
preted as usual; for Eϕ and Kϕ we have:
(M,w) |= Eϕ iﬀ ϕ ∈ E(w)
(M,w) |= Kϕ iﬀ for all u ∈ W, Rwu implies (M,u) |= ϕ.
On these models we can impose standard epistemic assumptions
about the accessibility relation, such as reﬂexivity, transitivity, and
symmetry. But these are orthogonal to our main concerns in this paper.
It is easy to visualize how our mixed models work:
Example 1.
p,q
{p}
In this one-world model, the agent knows implicitly
that p and also that q. But while she is explicitly
aware that p holds, she is not aware that q holds, so
her explicit knowledge about p, q diﬀers.4 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
In models with more than one world, a genuine issue of interplay
arises: is awareness introspective? We will not assume strong introspec-
tion in the sense that entertained sets are closed under the operator E.
But in our intended class of models M, we will assume the weaker
introspection principle that being entertained is implicitly known:
Weak introspection: Entertained formulas are preserved under epis-
temic accessibility: if ϕ ∈ E(w) and Rwu, then ϕ ∈ E(u).
The calculus of reasoning with these notions is standard. The formu-
las of L valid in models in M are those provable in the minimal modal
logic K for implicit knowledge plus the axiom of ‘weak introspection’:
Eϕ → KEϕ
Soundness and completeness are proved by standard techniques.
3. Deﬁning explicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge as a deﬁned notion. Combining implicit and
entertained information produces several kinds of explicit information.
Options start with the Kϕ ∧ Eϕ of Fagin and Halpern (1988), which
says that ϕ is implicitly known and explicitly considered. But there are
others. It is not so clear to us which notion is most suited, but there
are some obvious desiderata. Explicit knowledge should imply implicit
knowledge, and it should be subject to implicit, though not to explicit
introspection. This suggests the alternative version
Exϕ := K(ϕ ∧ Eϕ)
or equivalently, Kϕ ∧ KEϕ. In general, this deﬁnition is not equiva-
lent to that of Fagin and Halpern (1988), but it is if we assume weak
introspection like above, plus reﬂexivity of accessibility. Then we get
|=M K(ϕ ∧ Eϕ) ↔ (Kϕ ∧ Eϕ)
It is also easy to see that both notions satisfy our earlier desiderata,
modulo some mild conditions on the epistemic base logic. More gener-
ally, Grossi and Vel´ azquez-Quesada (2009) discuss how assumptions on
the underlying base logic of K and E determine properties of explicit
information and relations between options. In particular, they discuss
positive and negative implicit introspection about explicit knowledge:
Exϕ → KExϕ ¬Exϕ → K¬ExϕInference, Promotion, and the Dynamics of Awareness 5
We will assume the deﬁnition Exϕ := K(ϕ ∧ Eϕ) henceforth for
explicit knowledge. Among other candidates, one that appeals to us is:
Kϕ∧EKϕ, where the implicit knowledge itself has the agent’s explicit
attention. We will not pursue this option – but it does show the need
for a framework that can describe the dynamics of many proposals.
Explicit knowledge as a primitive notion. It may be useful at
this stage to explain how we are deviating here from our earlier work
(van Benthem, 2008; Vel´ azquez-Quesada, 2009). There we assumed a
primitive notion of explicit knowledge (“awareness that”), treated as
a map assigning formulas to worlds, but not identiﬁed with any com-
bination of operators K and E. We only assumed that all explicitly
known formulas were implicitly known, and hence in particular, that
they were true. But then, updates that can change truth values of
epistemic assertions: I might be aware now that I do not know that p,
but learning that p will invalidate this explicit knowledge. And other
natural actions may change truth values of formulas involving E. Based
on these observations, we found the need for dropping all persistence of
explicit knowledge under update, except for purely factual assertions.
Our current approach of deﬁning explicit knowledge will circumvent
this diﬃculty, since the deﬁnition automatically ‘recomputes’ what is
explicit knowledge following an update with epistemic side-eﬀects.
On the other hand, and we acknowledge that this is a drawback
of the approach in this paper, there may be something sui generis to
the notion of explicit knowledge that ϕ, not reducible to just implicit
knowledge and awareness of ϕ. I might be thinking of ϕ, and also know
it implicitly, and still fail to see directly that it is true. Think of a
conclusion that I am pondering, and that in fact follows from some
premises whose truth I am aware of. I could still fail to see how it
follows explicitly. We will return to this discussion later.
For now, we move to our second main issue, viz. how agents can
‘improve’ their current brand of knowledge about a proposition. This
is not a matter of static implications between brands of implicit and
explicit knowledge. As we have said before, the correct question to ask
here is a dynamic one: what does an agent have to do to upgrade her im-
plicit knowledge? To some readers, introducing the explicit actions that
lead to more omniscient states may demystify them. In Conan Doyle’s
detective stories, the explanation oﬀered at the end turns Holmes’
‘magical powers’ into a sequence of simple observations and deductive
acts, making the procedure “elementary, my dear Watson”. While this
is true, it also underscores the power of successive small steps.6 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
4. Operations on epistemic awareness models
Our epistemic awareness models suggest a natural and simple dynam-
ics. Though the agent is not logically omniscient anymore, she can get
new information by various acts, including observation and inference.
But we want to dig deeper. In line with our deﬁnition for explicit
knowledge, it also makes sense to look for simplest actions transforming
models that can be put together to analyze more complex informational
acts. We will see later on how these transform explicit knowledge.
Deﬁning the basic actions. Our models have two separate com-
ponents for representing information: the accessibility relation and the
entertained sets. The following operations modify these components in
a simple way, allowing us to deﬁne complex epistemic actions later on.
The consider operation represents an “awareness raising” action:
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Public consider operation). Let M = hW,R,E,V i be
a model and χ any formula in L. The model M+χ = hW,R,E0,V i is M
with its entertained sets extended with χ, that is,
E0(w) := E(w) ∪ {χ} for every w ∈ W
We must check at once that this stays inside our intended models:
Proposition 1. The consider operation preserves the assumptions on
M: if M satisﬁes weak introspection, then so does M+χ.
Proof. Take a world w in M and any ϕ ∈ E0(w). Suppose Rwu. If ϕ is
already in E(w), then ϕ ∈ E(u) because M satisﬁes the property, and
then ϕ ∈ E0(u) by the deﬁnition of E0. If ϕ is not in E(w), then it should
be χ itself, which by the above deﬁnition is also in E0(u).
‘Considering’ extends the information an agent entertains, but we
can also deﬁne a neglecting operation with the opposite eﬀect: reducing
entertained sets. This ﬁts with the operational idea that agents can
expand and shrink the set of issues having their current attention.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Public neglecting operation). Let M = hW,R,E,V i
be a model and χ a formula in L. The model M−χ = hW,R,E0,V i
reduces M’s entertained sets by removing χ, that is,
E0(w) := E(w) \ {χ} for every w ∈ W
Proposition 2. Neglecting, too, preserves weak introspection.
This operation can be seen as a form of “forgetting”, an action
usually disregarded in dynamic-epistemic logic (but see van Ditmarsch
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The preceding actions aﬀect what an agent entertains. The next,
known from dynamic-epistemic logic, modiﬁes her implicit knowledge:
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Public implicit observation). Let M = hW,R,E,V i
be a model and χ a formula in L. The model M!χ = hW0,R0,E0,V 0i has
− W0 := {w ∈ W | (M,w) |= χ} − R0 := R ∩ (W0 × W0)
− E0(w) := E(w) for all w ∈ W0 − V 0(p) := V (p) ∩ W0
Proposition 3. Implicit observation preserves weak introspection for
entertained propositions.
Proof. The sub-model M!χ has the same entertained sets at its worlds
as M, and its epistemic accessibility is a subrelation of that for M.
Building complex actions. Complex actions can now be built by
combining basic ones. As an example, it seems natural to think that a
public observation of some fact is in fact done consciously, generating
awareness. The corresponding operation of “explicit seeing” (van Ben-
them, 2008; Vel´ azquez-Quesada, 2009) can be deﬁned as an implicit
observation followed by an act of consideration:
MPA(χ) := (M!χ)+χ
The deﬁnition would also work in the opposite order, given that
we are transforming two independent components of our models. Of
course, the earlier-mentioned issue of acts invalidating explicit knowl-
edge returns here. We might observe an epistemic fact ϕ, consider its
content, and yet, through the very update, ﬁnd that we no longer know
that ϕ is true. But this seems right: and indeed, the earlier deﬁnition of
awareness that in terms of implicit knowledge and entertainment will
tell us which propositions we explicitly know after the act.
Still, one might argue that implicit observation and considering take
place simultaneously. While this makes sense, we will not pursue it here.
5. The actions in action
Consider the following model:
p,q p,¬q
{} {}
In the leftmost world the agent does not
even know implicitly that q. But she knows
implicitly that p, though not explicitly.8 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
After the agent considers p, we get the
model on the right: in its leftmost world,
the agent now knows explicitly that p.
p,q p,¬q
{p} {p}
Lifting a restriction in van Benthem, Vel´ azquez-Quesada (2008, 2009),
our agent can also get explicit knowledge about her own entertained,
implicit and explicit information. Here is how this can happen:
p,q p,¬q
{p,Exp} {p,Exp}
When she considers Exp, we get the model
on the left. The agent knows explicitly that
she has explicit knowledge of p. By acting,
she has achieved positive introspection.
Next, consider the above explicit public announce-
ment of q: an implicit observation followed by con-
sideration of q. This yields the model on the right
where q is now explicitly known by the agent (Exq).
p,q
{p,Exp,q}
p,q
{Exp,q}
Finally, neglecting p makes the agent lose earlier ex-
plicit knowledge about it (in our case, we get ¬Exp).
Moreover, she no longer has explicit knowledge that
Exp, since the latter formula is no longer true, and
therefore, it is no longer implicitly known.
There are many further scenarios with complex many-world pat-
terns, but the above will suﬃce to show the interest of our setting.
6. A complete dynamic logic
In order to express how our dynamic operations aﬀect implicit knowl-
edge, entertainment, and explicit knowledge, we extend the static epis-
temic awareness language with modalities representing each basic oper-
ation. If χ and ϕ are formulas in the resulting extended language (still
called L in this section), then so are
[+χ]ϕ after the agent considers χ, ϕ is the case.
[−χ]ϕ after the agent neglects χ, ϕ is the case.
[!χ]ϕ after the agent implicit observes χ, ϕ is the case.Inference, Promotion, and the Dynamics of Awareness 9
Deﬁnition 6.1. Let (M,w) be a pointed semantic model with M =
hW,R,E,V i, and let χ,ϕ be formulas in the extended language L:
(M,w) |= [+χ]ϕ iﬀ (M+χ,w) |= ϕ
(M,w) |= [−χ]ϕ iﬀ (M−χ,w) |= ϕ
(M,w) |= [!χ]ϕ iﬀ (M,w) |= ϕ implies (M!χ,w) |= ϕ
The main diﬀerence among the new modalities is the precondition.
The agent can consider or neglect a formula χ without any further
requirement, but for her to implicitly observe χ, χ needs to be true.
6.1. Dynamic completeness theorem
We now formulate a sound and complete logic for the semantic validities
in the extended language L:
Theorem 1. The valid formulas of the dynamic-epistemic awareness
language L (in models of M) are just those provable by the axioms
and rules for the static base language (see Section 2) plus the reduction
axioms and modal inference rules listed in Table I.
Proof. We use standard techniques from dynamic-epistemic logic (cf.
van Benthem et al. (2006)). Our axioms run through all cases needed
to reduce a innermost occurrence of a dynamic operator. Iterating this
produces an equivalent formula in the static base language.
Table I. Sound and complete logic for dynamic epistemic awareness logic.
` [+χ]p ↔ p ` [−χ]p ↔ p
` [+χ]Eχ ↔ > ` [−χ]Eχ ↔ ⊥
` [+χ]Eϕ ↔ Eϕ for ϕ 6= χ ` [−χ]Eϕ ↔ Eϕ for ϕ 6= χ
` [+χ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[+χ]ϕ ` [−χ]¬ϕ ↔ ¬[−χ]ϕ
` [+χ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [+χ]ϕ ∧ [+χ]ψ ` [−χ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [−χ]ϕ ∧ [−χ]ψ
` [+χ]Kϕ ↔ K[+χ]ϕ ` [−χ]Kϕ ↔ K[−χ]ϕ
From ` ϕ infer ` [+χ]ϕ From ` ϕ infer ` [−χ]ϕ
` [!χ]p ↔ χ → p
` [!χ]Eϕ ↔ χ → Eϕ
` [!χ]¬ϕ ↔ χ → ¬[!χ]ϕ
` [!χ](ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ [!χ]ϕ ∧ [!χ]ψ
` [!χ]Kϕ ↔ χ → K[!χ]ϕ
From ` ϕ infer ` [!χ]ϕ10 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
These principles express the syntactic basics of considering and ne-
glecting, merged with the axioms of public announcement logic PAL.
For instance, how does entertained information change when the agent
considers χ? We have two cases. After considering χ, the agent enter-
tains a ϕ 6= χ iﬀ she entertained ϕ before; but also, considering χ always
makes the agent entertain χ. The eﬀect of neglecting χ is analogous. The
additional commutation clauses express the independence of modifying
the domain of worlds and sets of entertained formulas.
6.2. How the logic describes our major issues
Our logic states how each basic operator of the language is aﬀected
by our three actions. By combining eﬀects and unfolding deﬁnitions,
the logic also explains how derived notions of explicit knowledge fare
under these actions. We discuss a few cases, using our earlier deﬁnition
K(ϕ ∧ Eϕ), and suppressing detailed calculations:
Explicit knowledge. For the action of considering χ and explicit
knowledge about a diﬀerent formula ϕ we get the valid principle
[+χ]Exϕ ↔ K([+χ]ϕ ∧ Eϕ) (for ϕ 6= χ).
We leave it to the reader to put this analysis into words. One might
have expected a simpler direct reduction principle [+χ]Exϕ ↔ Exϕ,
but this formula is not valid, since the considering action may have
changed truth values for sub-formulas of ϕ.
In the particular case of explicit knowledge about χ itself, however,
unfolding via the reduction axiom yields
[+χ]Exχ ↔ K[+χ]χ
This shows how the considering action makes implicit knowledge ex-
plicit: we will look at this in more detail below. Going back to the initial
discussion about the distribution axiom, the formula
Ex(ϕ → ψ) → (Exϕ → Kψ)
is valid, since the antecedent implies the premises of the distribution
law for K. Then, considering is the action that ‘ﬁlls the gap’:
Ex(ϕ → ψ) → (Exϕ → [+ψ]Exψ) is valid
One might think that the real act here is a richer one of drawing
the inference, but in our analysis is the explicit consideration of the
conclusion that ‘gives the last little push’ toward explicit knowledge.
Behind this observation lies a general fact that reﬂects the analysis of
actions of epistemic “promotion” in van Benthem (2008):Inference, Promotion, and the Dynamics of Awareness 11
Fact. The formula Kϕ → [+ϕ]Exϕ is valid.
Proof. Using our reduction axioms as above, we get that
[+ϕ]Exϕ ↔ [+ϕ]K(ϕ ∧ Eϕ)
↔ K[+ϕ]ϕ ∧ K[+ϕ]Eϕ
↔ K[+ϕ]ϕ
But the latter follows from Kϕ, since we have quite generally that
the formula ϕ → [+ϕ]ϕ is valid.
The reason is that, given our semantics, and act of considering ϕ can
only change truth values for Eϕ and formulas containing it. But the
formula ϕ itself is too short to be aﬀected by this.
Thus, our current proposal realizes the intuitive expectations in our
Introduction. But it can describe more, including the behaviour of ex-
plicit knowledge under the neglecting operation. Here is what happens
with formulas ϕ that diﬀer from the neglected χ:
[−χ]Exϕ ↔ K([−χ]ϕ ∧ Eϕ) (for ϕ 6= χ)
With explicit knowledge about the formula χ itself, considering
produces a trivialization to ‘end-points’:
[−χ]Exχ ↔ K⊥
If the agent’s implicit information is true, however (say, epistemic acces-
sibility is reﬂexive), we get ¬[−χ]Exχ: one never has explicit knowledge
about χ after neglecting it. Still, the agent does keep χ as implicit
knowledge, witness the valid law
Exχ → [−χ]Kχ
A precise justiﬁcation runs like that for the preceding Fact.
Finally, we analyze the eﬀect of an implicit observation over ex-
plicit knowledge. For any ϕ and χ, unfolding the deﬁnition of explicit
knowledge via our axioms (we suppress intermediate steps here) gives
[!χ]Exϕ ↔ (χ → K([!χ]ϕ ∧ (χ → Eϕ)))
Again, we leave it to the reader to state this fact informally. This out-
come is our solution to the earlier-mentioned problem of update making
explicit knowledge ‘out of synch’ with implicit knowledge. (Recall that
this was the reason for the restriction to purely factual assertions in van
Benthem, Vel´ azquez-Quesada (2008, 2009).) Explicit knowledge is now12 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
a deﬁned notion, so it automatically re-adjusts to whatever happens to
the modalities K and E, and our logic tells us precisely how.
We have extracted the eﬀect of our basic epistemic actions over
explicit knowledge deﬁned as K(ϕ ∧ Eϕ). Thus, we replace discussion
whether agents have epistemic closure by a much richer picture of what
they can do to update and “upgrade” their knowledge. Moreover, this
style of analysis works not only for the stated notion of explicit knowl-
edge; it can also provide us with validities expressing the way other
possible notions are aﬀected, like the already mentioned Kϕ ∧ EKϕ.
6.3. Schematic validities and algebra of actions
While all this seems straightforward dynamic epistemic technique, there
is a catch. In deriving the principles of the previous section, we have
used more than the reduction axioms of our logic per se. Several impor-
tant ‘schematic’ principles did not follow from our reduction axioms.
In particular, we have used the two principles
[+χ]χ ↔ χ and [−χ]χ ↔ χ
whose validity involved additional considerations. Of course, each spe-
ciﬁc instance of such a formula can be derived, given our completeness
theorem. But that does not mean there is any illuminating uniform
derivation of an “algebraic” sort. Indeed, it is a well-known (though not
much-publicized) open problem, even for public announcement logic,
to characterize its schematic validities, not dependent on the special
treatment of atomic formulas in PAL. Given the importance of such
principles here, that problem becomes even more urgent.
Algebra of actions. We end with one further source of schematic
validities. As important as it is to understand how actions aﬀect our
information, their own structure is of interest, too. We brieﬂy mention
some relevant validities, to show that we have the beginnings of an
interesting “algebra of actions”:
− In general, neglecting does not neutralize considering ([+χ][−χ]ϕ ↔
ϕ is not valid): if the agent initially entertains χ, considering makes
no change, but neglecting does, yielding a model where χ is not
entertained. The actual validity is the qualiﬁed
¬Eχ → ([+χ][−χ]ϕ ↔ ϕ)
− The dual case behaves in the same way: considering does not
neutralize neglecting in general – but we do have:
Eχ → ([−χ][+χ]ϕ ↔ ϕ)Inference, Promotion, and the Dynamics of Awareness 13
As for unqualiﬁed algebraic laws, we do have idempotence:
− A sequence of considering has the same eﬀect as a single one, and
the neglecting operation behaves in a similar way:
[+χ]ϕ ↔ [+χ][+χ]ϕ and [−χ]ϕ ↔ [−χ][−χ]ϕ
Given the dynamics of the system, we do not expect strong commu-
tation laws between considering and neglecting, but we do with implicit
observation, that modiﬁed an independent component of our models.
We will not pursue the resulting action algebra here (it will get even
nicer when we restrict attention to just factual assertions). But it does
demonstrate the same desideratum beyond standard axiomatizations
in dynamic-epistemic logic. Even public announcement logic PAL has
a hidden algebra of successive announcements – but it tends to go
unnoticed, as two successive announcements can be compressed into
one. But this compression disappears with extensions to relation change
for belief or preference, as has been noted in the literature. The same
is true here, and hence the additional axiomatization issues.
7. From single to multi-agent scenarios
So far, we have considered activities of single agents, including their ob-
servations, but also their acts of inference. Now the latter are typically
private, and hence it makes sense to look at scenarios with privacy. A
bit paradoxically, privacy only becomes visible in a multi-agent setting.
Here is an initial illustration, with two agents:
Example 2. Consider the following model M, generalizing the single-
agent framework to a multi-agent setting in a straightforward way:
p
E1 = {}
E2 = {}
1, 2 In the only world of the model, each agent knows im-
plicitly that p, but no agent entertains p (¬E1p∧¬E2p).
Moreover, agents have implicit higher-order knowledge
about each other. E.g., agent 2 knows implicitly that
agent 1 does not entertain p (K2¬E1p).
Now let an event take place: agent 1 considers p: M+p is given by
p
E1 = {p}
E2 = {}
1, 2
In the new situation, agent 1 entertains p (E1p), and
now has explicit knowledge about it. But there is more:
agent 2 now knows implicitly that agent 1 entertains p
(K2E1p), but without knowing this explicitly.14 Johan van Benthem and Fernando R. Vel´ azquez-Quesada
Is this a realistic scenario? It seems strange that an action of 1 alone
can aﬀect the information of agent 2. To get clearer on this, we need
a more detailed analysis of how epistemic awareness models should
change, in a setting allowing privacy.
7.1. Multi-agent static framework
The extension of the static epistemic awareness framework to a setting
with many agents in a group A is straightforward. In the language of
multi-agent L, we just add agent indexes to the E and the K modalities
(Ei and Ki, respectively). In the semantic models, R becomes a function
from A to ℘(W × W) returning an accessibility relation Ri for each
agent i ∈ A, and E becomes a function from A × W to ℘(L) returning
the entertained set Ei(w) of each agent i at each possible world w. The
semantic interpretation of formulas is then as before, using Ei and Ri
to interpret modalities Eiϕ and Kiϕ, respectively.
In this multi-agent case we will not impose special semantic con-
straints, such as the earlier weak introspection principle. In private set-
tings with single-agent actions of considering and neglecting, it makes
more sense to reinterpret the K modalities as beliefs that can be mis-
taken, as is also done in standard dynamic-epistemic logic.
7.2. Multi-agent actions: the general case
To make our actions private, we need a mechanism that lets actions
aﬀect agents in diﬀerent ways. The action models of Baltag et al.
(1999) will do this, provided we extend them in the manner of van
Benthem et al. (2006). That is, events can now really change the
world, coming not just with preconditions on their executability, but
also with postconditions describing what changes they bring about:
Deﬁnition 7.1 (Multi-agent action model). With P the set of atomic
propositions and A the ﬁnite set of agents, a multi-agent action model
is a tuple A = hS,T,Pre,Posi where:
− hS,T,Prei is an action model (Baltag et al., 1999) with S a ﬁnite
non-empty set of events, T : A → ℘(W × W) a function returning
an accessibility relation Ti for each agent i ∈ A and Pre : S → L the
precondition function indicating where each event can be executed.
− Pos : (A × S × ℘(L)) → ℘(L) is the postcondition function,
assigning a new set of formulas in L to every tuple of an agent,
event, and (old) set of formulas in L.
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Recall that we want to model private versions of our operations
that modify entertained sets. This is exactly the role of the Pos func-
tion, a variation on the substitution function deﬁned in van Benthem
et al. (2006) for representing factual change. The following update rule
describes how our action models modify epistemic awareness models.
Deﬁnition 7.2 (Product update). Let M = hW,R,E,V i be a multi-
agent semantic model and let A = hS,T,Pre,Posi be a multi-agent
action model. The product model M ⊗ A = hW0,R0,E0,V 0i is given by
− W0 := {(w,s) | (M,w) |= Pre(s)} − R0
i(w,s)(w0,s0) iﬀ Riww0 & Tiss0
− V 0(p) := {(w,s) ∈ W0 | w ∈ V (p)} − Y 0
i (w,s) := Posi(s,Yi(w))
Note how the Pos function works: for each agent i and each event
s, Pos takes agent i’s entertained set at w in M, and returns her
entertained set at (w,s) in M ⊗A. Later on, we will look at restrictions
on the syntactic format of deﬁnition for the postcondition function.
In order to express how product updates aﬀect the agent’s informa-
tion, the extended multi-agent language L has extra modalities:
if (A,s) is a pointed action model and ϕ is a formula in
the extended multi-agent L, then so is [(A,s)]ϕ.
The semantic interpretation of these new formulas is provided here:
Deﬁnition 7.3. Let (M,w) be a pointed multi-agent semantic model
and let (A,s) be a pointed action model with A = hS,T,Pre,Posi.
(M,w) |= [(A,s)]ϕ iﬀ (M,w) |= Pre(s) implies (M ⊗ A,(w,s)) |= ϕ
7.3. Private considering and neglecting
Now we can deﬁne private actions more precisely. Here are simple ver-
sions of the earlier considering and neglecting. As usual, these encode
what takes place, but also how diﬀerent agents ‘view’ this:
Deﬁnition 7.4 (Private considering action). Let χ be any formula in
multi-agent L. The private considering action of agent j is the pointed
action model (Pri
j
+χ,•) with Pri
j
+χ = hS,T,Pre,Posi as
− S := {•,◦} − Ti :=
(
{(•,•),(◦,◦)} if i = j
{(•,◦),(◦,◦)} otherwise
− Pre(•) = Pre(◦) := >
− Posj(•,L) := L ∪ {χ}, Posj(◦,L) := L
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The diagram on the right shows
the model Pri1
+χ in the 2-agent
case (preconditions omitted).
•
Pos1(L) := L ∪ {χ}
Pos2(L) := L
◦
Pos1(L) := L
Pos2(L) := L
1
2
1, 2
Deﬁnition 7.5 (Private neglecting action). Let χ be any formula in
multi-agent L. The private neglecting action of agent j, given by the
pointed action model (Pri
j
−χ,•), diﬀers from private considering only
in its postcondition function for agent j in •:
Posj(•,L) := L \ {χ}
These actions transform our initial epistemic awareness model:
Example 3. Recall the model M from Example 2. After agent 1
considers p privately (i.e., after applying (Pri1
+p,•)), we get the model:
(•,•)
E1 = {p}
E2 = {}
(•,◦)
E1 = {}
E2 = {}
1
2
1, 2 In the evaluation point, the leftmost world,
agent 1 entertains p (E1p), just like she does
after publicly considering p. But this time,
agent 2’s implicit knowledge does not change:
she still believes implicitly that agent 1 does
not entertain p (K2¬E1p).
7.4. Unconscious versions
The ﬂexibility of the postcondition mechanisms is great. We can repre-
sent many further scenarios, even unconscious actions, hidden from all
agents, including the one that ‘performs it! We just give an illustration:
Deﬁnition 7.6 (Unconscious neglecting action). Let χ be a formula
in the multi-agent L. The unconscious neglecting action of agent j,
given by the pointed action model (Unc
j
−χ,•), diﬀers from its private
counterpart only in the deﬁnition of the accessibility relation:
Ti := {(•,◦),(◦,◦)} for all agents i
•
Pos1(L) := L ∪ {χ}
Pos2(L) := L
◦
Pos1(L) := L
Pos2(L) := L
1, 2
1, 2
The diagram on the left depicts
Unc1
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Example 4. Consider the pointed model (M⊗Pri1
+p,(•,•)) of Example
3. If agent 1 now unconsciously neglects p, we get the model
•
E1 = {}
E2 = {}
◦
E1 = {p}
E2 = {}
◦
E1 = {}
E2 = {}
◦
E1 = {}
E2 = {}
1
2
1
2
2
2
In •, the agent does not entertain p
(¬E1p), but she implicitly believes
that she entertains it (K1E1p).
Much more can be said about this scenario, and we feel that we have
a promising take here on unconscious actions such as forgetting. But our
purpose here was just to demonstrate the ﬂexibility of the framework.
7.5. Complete dynamic logic for the multi-agent version
A complete dynamic logic for this system looks like our earlier single-
agent logic, with indices attached. Its principles for atomic formulas,
Boolean operations, and epistemic implicit knowledge are the usual
DEL versions. As an illustration, we have the valid equivalence
` [(A,s)]Kiϕ ↔ Pre(s) →
^
Tsr
Ki[(A,r)]ϕ
But the crucial issue is the reduction axiom for entertainment given
the postconditions. Consider the axioms that we gave for our basic
operations of considering and neglecting. These described the postcon-
ditions inside the language, exploiting the simple format of their eﬀects.
For instance, we had Eϕ after an act +χ if either we had it before, or
the two formulas were the same, and then it was true automatically.
This case distinction in the reduction axiom directly reﬂects the simple
disjunctive deﬁnition of the postcondition for the action +χ: being the
union of the old entertained set with χ. The same is true in our more
general setting: simple uniform deﬁnitions of postconditions in our
action models will automatically generate matching reduction axioms.
We will not pursue the technicalities of this mechanism here, but
there should be a deﬁnition scheme δ(φ) within our language for post-
conditions of awareness-set changing events, stating when a formula φ
belongs to the new set. The syntax of this scheme can then be used to
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in (van Benthem et al., 2006) is an illustration, exploiting the fact
that postconditions of its events were deﬁnable as simple syntactic
substitutions.
Even at this preliminary stage, our private awareness analysis sug-
gests interesting extensions of standard dynamic epistemic logic.
8. Other approaches
Many approaches deal with the problem of logical omniscience, and we
mention only a few. Our paper relates to these as follows.
First, we have provided a dynamic account for implicit and explicit
information in terms of epistemic actions of considering, neglecting and
implicitly observing. This extends the original approach in Fagin and
Halpern (1988), where no explicit dynamics is presented except for
temporal transitions without internal structure.
Second, unlike in recent approaches to inferential dynamics (Jago
(2009), van Benthem (2008), Vel´ azquez-Quesada (2009)), our agents’
explicit knowledge is not only about factual formulas. It also includes
‘higher’ information about their own information.
Third, our multi-agent framework extends Grossi and Vel´ azquez-
Quesada (2009) by allowing us to handle public, private and even
unconscious versions of the considering and neglecting actions.
Finally, we do not claim that our proposals make these earlier pro-
posals obsolete. In particular, we still feel that our deﬁnition-based
“reductionist” approach to explicit knowledge also has its drawbacks.
In an intuitive sense, explicit knowledge may be sui generis, and, for
instance, non-refutational uses of inference may also be considered as
‘single events’ that just increase this explicit knowledge. Even so, we
hope to have shown the potential of the reductionist approach.
9. Conclusions and further directions
Our paper shows how a signiﬁcant informational dynamics can take
place over existing epistemic awareness models, generalizing acts of
observation and inference. We also show how this leads to technical
systems and results about these, in the spirit of dynamic epistemic
logic. We have by no means explored all aspects of our proposal: our
multi-agent setting can describe many more agent activities than what
we have shown. Also, many technical issues remain unresolved: in par-
ticular, the issue of schematic validities and action algebra, and the
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A most urgent desideratum in our view concerns the clear interpreta-
tion shift in our multi-agent section. It was beliefs of agents that made
more sense there than knowledge. But once we take beliefs seriously,
we should redo our analysis in the setting of dynamic logics for acts
of belief revision (cf. Baltag and Smets, van Benthem (2008, 2007))
that work over epistemic plausibility models. Indeed, it makes much
sense to relate belief revision, not just to new observations, but also
to new inferences. This inferential dynamics should then also include
special mechanisms that aﬀect belief, rather than knowledge, that is:
default rules. It is a signiﬁcant issue how all this should be done. van
Benthem (2009) is a ﬁrst exploration, including some major changes
in the plausibility relation, that now does not just order worlds, but
worlds plus partial syntactic descriptions.
But our main point is not technical results, or concrete directions.
It is rather the general picture of agency arising from our analysis.
We replaced agents with “supernatural” abilities like omniscience by
human ones that must, and can work to improve their information.
The resulting mathematical model is rich, and much more attractive
than the usual ones. We mentioned Sherlock Holmes at some point in
our story, famous for combining observation and deduction. Dynamic
logics are about what makes this tick. As visitors to Reichenbach Falls
in Switzerland can see, our hero died a (ﬁctional) death at the hands
of the evil mathematician Professor Moriarty. But though these two
minds were enemies, their ﬁelds were not. We hope to have shown how
delicate philosophical issues can proﬁt from mathematical modeling.
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